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		 NetBSD Security Advisory 2006-003
		 =================================

Topic:		Multiple denial of services issues with racoon

Version:	NetBSD-current:	source prior to November 21, 2005
		NetBSD 3.0:	not affected
		NetBSD 2.1:	affected
		NetBSD 2.0.*:	affected
		NetBSD 2.0:	affected
		NetBSD 1.6.*:	affected
		NetBSD 1.6:	affected
		pkgsrc:		ipsec-tools packages prior to 0.6.3

Severity:	Denial of service, in some cases anonymously

Fixed:		NetBSD-current:		November 21, 2005
		NetBSD-2-1 branch: 	January 19, 2006
						(2.1.1 will include the fix)
		NetBSD-2-0 branch:	January 19, 2006
						(2.0.4 will include the fix)
		NetBSD-2 branch: 	January 19, 2006
		pkgsrc:			ipsec-tools-0.6.3 corrects this issue


Abstract
========

The University of Oulu (Finland) released a test-suite for the Internet 
Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) daemons available
in various devices and operating systems.  During their testing they identified
a number of issues in various implementations.

On further testing the racoon daemon supplied with NetBSD and in pkgsrc
were found to be vulnerable to a number of denial of service attacks.

http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/testing/c09/isakmp/index.html
http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20051114-01014.pdf


Technical Details
=================

NetBSD up to the 3.0 release used the racoon daemon from the KAME project. For
the 3.0 release this was changed to the ipsec-tools racoon daemon.

During the testing of both these ISAKMP implementations on NetBSD a number
of denial of service issues were identified.  There are three vulnerabilities
that are a result of two code paths in the source which allow a malicious
attacker to crash the racoon daemon. For this attack to be successful a number
of factors must occur:

- - The racoon daemon must be enabled (it is disabled by default)
- - The racoon daemon must be configured for aggressive mode (not recommended)
- - In order to trigger 2 of the 3 vulnerabilities the attacker must have an
  entry in the SPD

In addition to this the PROTOS test suite had a number of configuration
prerequisites including:

- - racoon's configuration to be 3DES/SHA1/DH2
- - no lifetime proposal or obey mode

None of the issues are currently know to result in the execution of
arbitrary code.


Solutions and Workarounds
=========================

A limited workaround could be to use ip filtering to only allow ISAKMP
traffic (500/udp, and 4500/udp if you use NAT-T) from known trusted sources.

The following instructions describe how to upgrade your racoon
binaries by updating your source tree and rebuilding and
installing a new version of racoon.

* NetBSD-current:

	Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2005-11-20
	should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2005-11-21 or later.

	The following directories need to be updated from the
	netbsd-current CVS branch (aka HEAD):
		crypto/dist/ipsec-tools
		lib/libipsec

	To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install racoon:
		# cd src
		# cvs update -d -P crypto/dist/ipsec-tools
		# cvs update -d -P lib/libipsec

		# cd lib/libipsec
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install

		# cd ../../sbin/setkey
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install

		# cd ../../usr.sbin/racoon
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install

* NetBSD 2.*:

	Systems running NetBSD 2.* sources dated from before
	2006-01-18 should be upgraded from NetBSD 2.* sources dated
	2006-01-19 or later.

	The following file needs to be updated from the
	netbsd-2, netbsd-2-0 or netbsd-2-1 CVS branch:
		crypto/dist/kame/racoon/isakmp_agg.c

	To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install racoon:

		# cd src
		# cvs update -d -P -r <branch_name> crypto/dist/kame/racoon/isakmp_agg.c
		# cd usr.sbin/racoon
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install

Thanks To
=========

The University of Oulu (Finland) for making the PROTOS test suite publicly
available.

Ipsec-tools core team member Yvan Vanhullebus for responding quickly to 
the identified issues and helping to provide fixes.

Adrian Portelli for performing the PROTOS testing, documenting and reporting 
the issues.

Dave Huang for reporting a racoon crash to NetBSD.

Revision History
================

	2006-03-29	Initial release


More Information
================

Advisories may be updated as new information becomes available.
The most recent version of this advisory (PGP signed) can be found at 
  ftp://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2006-003.txt.asc

Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.org/ and http://www.NetBSD.org/Security/.


Copyright 2006, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
Redistribution permitted only in full, unmodified form.

$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2006-003.txt,v 1.8 2006/03/29 21:20:33 adrianp Exp $

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